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Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(c), Plaintiff/Appellee Cynthia
Gines ("Gines") submits her Reply Brief herein.

ARGUMENT
I.

STATUTORY ANALYSIS

Appellant Ingersoll-Rand ("I-R") suggests that the definition
of fault found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2) extends "to any act
or omission which proximately causes damages."
Reply Brief at p.l.

See,

Defendants

I-R argues from this that an employer's

conduct may thus be considered as "fault" even though an employer
can have no fault. See,

Gines primary brief at p.11.

Aside from the obvious inconsistency in suggesting that one
without fault may nevertheless fit within the definition of fault,
this interpretation is inaccurate.

Section 37(2) defines "fault"

as "any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission... ."
Thus, to be "fault" the breach of duty, act or omission must be
actionable.

In other words, it must be capable of forming the

basis for an action at law.

This interpretation is buttressed by

the examples of claims contemplated in that section (negligence,
strict liability, etc.), all of which may be the basis for an
action for damages.

1

I-R's argument that "fault" may encompass fault-free conduct
which cannot be the basis for an action not only defies logic and
common sense, it subverts the plain language and intent of this
section.

II.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

I-R challenges Gines' depiction of the intent behind the
enactment of this Act by attacking Mr. Lloyd's affidavit.

While

it is true the Mr. Lloyd is not a legislatorf his affidavit
demonstrates

his direct and significant participation

in the

legislative process on behalf of the largest entity interested in
the issue of employer immunity:
Utah.

the Workers Compensation Fund of

I-R's suggestion that the views of one having such direct

involvement be discounted because he is "only" a lobbyist1 asks
this Court to ignore a source with the greatest knowledge and
assistance.2
Be that as it may, Defendant ignores the best indicator of
legislative intent —

the actions of the legislature itself.

Its

modification of the language of proposed Section 39 (Utah Code Ann.
§78-27-39) to eliminate from consideration by the jury the fault
1

See,

I-R Reply Brief at P.2.

2

This Court undoubtedly recognizes that lobbyists are an
essential part of the legislative process without whose input and
assistance much legislation would not be possible.
2

attributable to "each other person whose fault contributed to the
injury or damages"3 is the strongest indication of the legislative
intent possible. It clearly shows that fault of non-parties is not
to be considered or compared.

III.

LAW OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS.

I-R's persistent reference to the law of other jurisdictions
is of little avail. Each of those decisions interpreted statutes
using language different from Utah's, in the context of worker's
compensation statutes different from Utah's and in circumstances
where the legislative intent supported the courts' conclusions.
The issue before the Court today requires interpretation of
Utah

law,

in

the

context

of

Utah's

worker's

compensation

legislation by reference to the unambiguous language of this
statute and the clear legislative intent behind it.
Defendant's reliance on the law of other jurisdictions is
misplaced and provides little support for the interpretation it
seeks.

3

Proposed Section 39 permitted the jury to determine the
proportionate fault "attributable to each person seeking recovery,
to each defendant, and to each other person whose fault contributed
to the injury or damages." As enacted, Section 39 provides only
that the jury shall determine the proportionate fault "attributable
to each person seeking recovery and to each defendant."

3

IV.
I-R's

reading

"piecemeal"

Lewis,

protection

of

abrogation

unreasonably narrow.
v.

CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT.
the constitutional
of

actions

for

prohibition
wrongful

against

death

is

See, Utah Const. Art. XVI, Section 5; Mai an

693 P.2d 661, 667 (Utah 1984).
prevents both abrogation

statutory limitation. Id.

This constitutional

of rights of

action and

The interpretation of this Act urged by

defendant both abrogates and unreasonably limits recovery for
wrongful death in the industrial setting.
Defendant contends that this Court's concern over piecemeal
abrogation relates only to differing effects of legislation on
different classes of persons. See, I-R

Reply Brief at 6. If that

is so, the Court's concern is properly directed at the untoward
effect of the statutory interpretation urged by Defendant, as it
would unfairly impact one class of wrongful death plaintiffs

—

those who have lost their decedent in industrial accidents.
The interpretation proposed by defendant would treat claims
for industrial deaths quite differently than those for wrongful
deaths

in other

circumstances.

The interpretation

urged by

defendant would reduce the available recovery to the damaged
parties by allocation of fault to the employer who cannot, by
operation of law, be required to answer in damages. This statutory
limitation would

occur without
4

justification

or a

substitute

benefit.

The interpretation urged by defendant contravenes the

constitutional prohibition of Utah Const. Art. XVI, Section 5 and
cannot be sustained.

CONCLUSION
The statutory language clearly and unambiguously precludes
consideration of an employer's "fault."

Any other construction

runs counter to the language and intent of the statute and the
protections of Utah Const. Art. XVI, Section 5. This Court should
conclude that the employer's conduct may not be considered by the
jury.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of May, 1992.
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